The purpose of this paper is to explore the spatial distribution of regional income and regional development funds (Community structural funds and region's own additional funds) among 145 European regions over 1989-1999. Using a set of tools of spatial statistics, we first detect the presence of global and local spatial autocorrelation in the distribution of regional per capita incomes. In other words rich (poor) regions tend to be clustered close to other rich (poor) regions. Global and local spatial autocorrelations also characterize the regional growth rate and regional funds. Second, the results of LISA statistics reveal the presence of spatial heterogeneity in the form of two spatial clusters of rich and poor regions over the decade as well, highlighting the persistence of a significant core-periphery pattern among European regions. However, the negative correlation between growth and initial income tends to confirm the hypothesis of β -convergence. In its efforts to favor cohesion, the European Commission allocates the majority of structural funds to peripheral regions where per capita GDP levels are low. A positive relationship between regional growth and structural funds is also identified among the significant results. Only Andalucia, Galicia and Sterea Ellada show atypical linkages. These results suggest further research including spatial effects, regional initial conditions and the spatial distribution of regional funds in the spatial econometric estimation of regional convergence in Europe.
Section 1-Introduction
The phenomenon of persistent income disparities among European regions has been widely studied in the literature, using β -convergence models most of the time based on neoclassical specifications (Esteban, 1994; Neven and Gouyette, 1995) . Together with σconvergence, these concepts have been criticized for several econometric problems they bring about, like the Galton's fallacy problem, and their inadequacy to explain economic polarization, persistent poverty and clustering (Quah, 1993) . In contrast, the concepts of convergence club (Durlauf and Johnson, 1995; Chatterji, 1992; Quah, 1996) and coreperiphery (Krugman, 1991a (Krugman, , 1991b Fujita et al., 1999) are compatible with the existence of multiple, locally stable steady state equilibria that are more relevant in the European regional case.
Another often-raised criticism is the majority of these empirical tests of regional income convergence are based on the same hypotheses as the ones underlying international income convergence: regions are considered as isolated entities, as if their geographical location and potential interregional linkages did not matter. Only recently, with the development of the appropriate tools of spatial statistics and spatial econometrics (Anselin, 1988 (Anselin, , 2001 Anselin and Berra, 1998) , the role of spatial effects has been considered in empirical works. These tools have been applied to regional convergence in the United-States (Rey and Montouri, 1999; Rey, 2001) , in Europe (Fingleton, 1999 and Baumont et al., 2002; Bivand and Brunstad, 2002) , in China (Ying, 2000) , in Brazil (Magalhães et al., 2000) , in Chile (Aroca et al., 2000) and Turkey (Gezici and Hewings, 2002) . The underlying idea, based on economic geographic theories and growth theories, is that forces driving to relocation/agglomeration process and hence to even/uneven regional development such as productivity (Hirschman, 1958) , transportation infrastructures Venables, 1995, 1996) , technology and knowledge spillovers (Martin and Ottaviano, 1999) , factor mobility (Krugman, 1991a, b; Puga, 1999) , have explicit geographic components. Since geographic spillover effects generate regional development, this last should exhibit a non-random distinctive geographic pattern. Applied to the spatial distribution of income, it means that the rich (poor) regions have a propensity to be clustered close to other rich (poor) regions.
However, the European Commission considers regional imbalances unacceptable on distributional and political grounds. The successive enlargements of the European Community to less developed countries have made regional disparities so obvious that 68% of structural funds are devoted to the least developed regions (objective 1). Structural funds are the most important instruments of the European regional development policy with Ecu 154.5 billion (at 1994 prices) over 1994-1999. Their impact on regional development is not clear yet: most of structural funds finance public infrastructures which are supposed to enhance cohesion among European regions (Aschauer, 1989) . But when such investments finance transportation infrastructures that come to a decrease in transportation costs, it may affect the process of industry location. As a result, they do not systematically benefit the region where they are implemented (Martin P., 2000; Vickerman, 1996) .
The purpose of this survey is to apply the newly developed techniques of spatial statistics on the distribution of per capita GDP and regional funds among 145 European regions over 1989-1999. The period under study corresponds to the first two programming periods that implemented and developed the European regional development policy to reduce the lack of cohesion among regions. The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 describes the linkages between regional funds and even/uneven regional development. Section 3 presents the data.
In section 4, we perform the exploratory spatial data analysis of the distribution of regional per capita GDP, of structural funds and of additional funds. The article concludes with a summary and some closing remarks.
Section 2-Impact of structural funds on the spatial distribution of income European regional assistance over 1989-1999 period dealt with six different objectives, the most important of which, with 68% of total structural funds devoted to this objective, was the objective 1. It was dedicated to the economic adaptation of the least developed regions. NUTS II level regions 2 were eligible under this objective when their per capita GDP (in PPP, Purchasing Power Parity) is below 75% of the Community average. This group included about 50 NUTS II level regions, from which the Italian regions Mezzogiorno, the whole regions of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, and about two third of the Spanish regions. With regards to the type of projects financed, one third of structural funds (Ecu 77 billion at 1999 prices) were devoted to transportation infrastructures. Transportation infrastructures have also been strongly supported through one half of the cohesion funds (Ecu 8 billion at 1999 2 NUTS: Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics. The Commission uses as regional statistical concept the spatial classification established by Eurostat on the basis of national administrative units. Europe can therefore be shared either in 77 NUTS I level regions, or 211 NUTS II, 1031 NUTS III, 1074 NUTS IV or 98433 NUTS V. Regional objectives are however mostly designated at either NUTS II or NUTS III level regions. prices), the second main instrument of regional policies, allocated since 1994 to Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. They will not be formally included in the rest of the analysis since they are allocated at the national but not regional level, and since no data display their regional distribution. For the European Commission, transportation infrastructures play a key role in the efforts to reduce the lack of cohesion among members.
However, from a theoretical as well as empirical point of view, their impact on regional development is not clear. On the one hand the endogenous growth models à la Aschauer (1989) and Barro (1990) predict that if public infrastructures are an input in the production function, then policies financing new public infrastructures increase the marginal product of private capital, fostering thus capital accumulation and growth. On the other hand, the economic geography theoretical works developed by Martin and Rogers (1995) and Martin P. (2000) demonstrate when transportation infrastructures are financed, they affect the process of industry location and lead to involuntary effects: financing intra-regional transport infrastructures in the poorest regions increases the probability of firms locating there, but reduces the country's aggregate growth rate and increases regional income inequalities, whereas interregional transport infrastructures foster the aggregate growth, but lead to greater concentration in the core. Moreover, an increasing part of the new transport infrastructures planed for the development of the trans-European network tend to be built within and between core regions, where transport demand is the highest (Vickerman, 1991 (Vickerman, , 1996 . Only the regions that belong to the main network will gain in accessibility, whereas the regions that do not belong to it or are located at the edge of it will not.
The relationship between gain in accessibility and economic development in peripheral regions is not clear and requires further research, since it depends on the specific requirement in transport cost of each singular sector. It is stated however that gains in accessibility due to interregional transport infrastructures will always be relatively higher in the core region than in the peripheral one (Vickerman et al., 1999; Venables and Gasiorek, 1999) . Peripheral regions have generally lower unit costs than core regions which may attract activities to locate there. However, this also depends on the level of transport infrastructure, the lack of which impedes the development of growth potential in periphery, but the improvement of which does not necessarily promote its growth.
Three other points confirm that the allocation of regional funds does not guarantee regional development. First, a firm located in the targeted region does not necessarily undertake the construction of new infrastructures. As a result, a part of the value added of a project in one region may first benefit another location. Second, beyond this apparent desire to reduce interregional income inequalities, the Community aid is not necessarily correlated to the development gap. As pointed out by Fayolle and Lecuyer (2000) , only objective 1 was devoted to the poorest regions. Objectives 2 and 3 (respectively for regions affected by industrial crisis and regions with long-term unemployment), even if they handle lower amounts, concern aids to reconverting and to industry restructuring that affect mostly regions which were formerly prosperous. Finally, a particular project is never implemented without additional regional or national financing. This is the principle of additionality that impedes regions to present unviable projects 3 . There is a bias introduced through this principle which comes from the fact that poor regions have problems to accompany the European aid in poor regions, whereas they can be tripled or quadrupled in regions with medium or high income levels, as they are more able to complement structural funds (Martin R., 1998) .
Section 3-Data
The regional per capita GDP series in Ecu current prices come from the database NewCronos Regio by Eurostat. This is the official database used by the European Commission for its evaluation of regional convergence. We use the logarithms of the per capita GDP of each Community funds support up to 75% of total public expenditure in NUTS regions, the rest depends on national or regional additionality in order to avoid regions present unviable projects. The ceilings vary according to the objective concerned: objective 1 finances a maximum 75% of the total cost, but 80% in cohesion countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland) and 85% in the most remote regions and the outlying Greek islands. The other objectives financed a maximum 50% of the total cost. and 4,(July and Dec., 1992) 4 and for 1994-1999, from The 11 th annual report on the structural funds. The data represent the total payments plus the total engagements of the European Commission at the data of publication of the 11 th report. Some of the funds were allocated to 6 German NUTS I regions and 2 Belgian NUTS I regions. We therefore disaggregate these funds at the NUTS II level with respect to their objective and their redistribution pattern 5 . With regard to total cost of Community projects, we apply the same methodology and take also into account the fact that the richer NUTS 2 regions within the NUTS 1 region have more facility to accompany Community funds. This allows to respect the bias introduced by additional funds. Since these data are not annually available and we want to consider funds relatively to the local population, data are divided by the number of inhabitant (average over 1989-1999) for each region and expressed in constant prices. As we have seen in the previous section, structural funds are just a part of the financing of public infrastructures in lagging regions. Since national and regional co-financings also support Community investments, we will also consider the total cost of Community projects over the same period.
We are aware that our empirical results could be affected by missing regions and by the use of different levels of spatial aggregation. The choice of the spatial aggregation influences the magnitude of various measures of association. In the literature, this problem is referred to the modifiable areal unit problem (MAUP) well known to geographers (see Openshaw and 7 Taylor, 1979) , also called problem of ecological fallacy (Anselin and Cho, 2000) . Messner and Anselin (2001) add that scale is important as well. If the scale and spatial extent of units of observations for the data do not match up the scale and spatial extent of the studied process, then it may result in a statistical problem wherein spatially correlated and/or heteroskedastic error structures occur. For instance, the area of Castilla-y-Leon (in Spain) is 585 times greater than the one of Brussels (Belgium), but both are official NUTS II regions (Casellas and Galley, 1999) . Moreover, per capita growth in open formal NUTS 2 regions may reflect characteristics of neighboring regions. Boldrin and Canova (2001) show the problem linked to measuring a variable on a territorial unit artificially defined in which people are free to move. They give the example of the city of Hamburg which is a NUTS II level region with high per capita income, but half the population of the whole Hamburg metropolitan area lives in the nearby NUTS II level regions of Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony, commuting to Hamburg for work. As a result, the value added in Hamburg is overstated by 20% relative to its effective population, while those of Schleswig-Holstein (value added equals 102% of EU average) and Lower Saxony (104%) are understated. This is similar for Ile de France (160%) and Bassin Parisien (92.7%), Communidad de Madrid (101%) and its two neighboring Castillas (66 and 76%).
Section 4-Exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA)
ESDA is a set of techniques used to describe and visualize spatial distributions, identify atypical locations or spatial outliers, discover patterns of spatial association, clusters or hot spots, and suggest spatial regimes or other forms of spatial heterogeneity (Anselin, 1988 (Anselin, , 1999 Messner and Anselin, 2001; Haining, 1990) 
4.1-Choropleth map
We start the analysis with the figure 1 6 . It is a choropleth map displaying the distribution of regional per capita GDP level in 1989 relative to the European average. A clear coreperiphery pattern appears in this map, with the core (the darker color) composed of the richest regions, whereas the peripheral regions are also the poorest ones. Four different categories are presented. The first one includes the regions of Ireland, Portugal, Greece, the majority of the Spanish regions and six southern Italian since their per capita GDP was below 75% of the 6 All figures have been realized using ArcView GIS 3.2 (Esri).
European average in 1989 (objective 1). The other categories show the distribution of regional income below the average but superior to 75% (75%-100%), higher than the average (100%-150%) and strongly greater than the average (>150%). Three regions had an exceptionally greater level of income than the overall distribution (greater than 1.5 interquartile ranges), thus are considered as outliers. These are the regions of Hamburg and Darmstadt in Germany, Ile-de-France in France. These results are partly due to the great commuting from their neighboring regions, as mentioned earlier.
<<insert figure 1 here>>
We do not need to display a map for the final year 1999. The core-periphery pattern is still apparent. Only the situation of the two Irish regions has clearly improved in comparison with the initial year. Actually the Irish per capita GDP is greater than the EU average since 1997.
Figure 2 displays the distribution (in quartile) of the sum of structural funds on the average regional GDP over 1989-1999. As expected, the poor and peripheral regions are the one that benefited the most from Community support. Note that two core regions (Hainaut in Belgium and Flevoland in Netherlands) belong to the most assisted regions as well. They even received more structural assistance than Attiki (Greece) or some Portuguese or Spanish regions. It may be explained by the fact that these two regions received high structural funds, but under objective 2 (for regions in industrial decline), whereas the poor Portuguese and Spanish regions received assistance under objective 1. As explained in section 2, structural assistance is not only based on the objective of reducing income gaps. We do not perform an analysis of detecting outliers since the map makes clear that the poor and peripheral regions received exceptionally high levels of structural funds compared to the sample mean. <<insert figure 2 here>> Figure 3 presents the ratio total project cost on structural funds (in quartile). The greater is this ratio, the greater is the regional or national co-financing in the total investment. In the poorest regions (first quartile), the total cost is until 2.2 times higher than the level of structural funds. It means that the region itself has to pay an amount equal to 1.2 times the level of structural funds. As pointed out in section 2, peripheral regions are just able to double the Community support (first quartile), whereas the wealthiest north Spanish regions and numerous core regions succeed in providing from 2.5 to 6.4 times the amount committed by structural funds (last quartile).
<< insert figure 3 here>>
Choropleth maps are a useful tool to describe the general characteristics of the distribution of per capita GDP throughout European regions. However, the range of each category defined in the previous choropleth maps is pretty big, and choropleth maps do not allow to say whether the spatial distribution of this variable is significantly persistent over the period.
Moreover, they are also limited in the ability to identify any significant spatial effects we defined in section 2.1.
4.2-Determination of the spatial weight matrix
Before going further in the spatial analysis of regional income distribution, we need to say some words on the construction of the spatial weight matrix, since all the following analysis relies on the definition of space throughout the weight matrix. In the European context, the existence of islands such as the United-Kingdom, Ireland or Corse impedes to consider simple contiguity matrices, otherwise the weight matrix includes rows and columns with only zeros. Since unconnected observations are eliminated from the results of the global statistics, this would change the sample size and the interpretation of the statistical inference.
Following the recommendations of Anselin (1996) and Anselin and Bera (1998) , we choose to base them on pure geographical distance, as exogeneity of geographical distance is unambiguous 7 . More precisely, we use the great circle distance between regional centroids.
The great distance circle allows to consider that the relevant direction of the dependence can take place in every direction. As in Le , we base our weight matrices on the k = 10, 15, 20 nearest neighbors. 7 In the case of European regions, it could be attractive to base these weights on the channels of communication between regions, such as roads and railways (see Bodson and Peeters, 1975) . However, as pointed out by Anselin and Bera (1998) , "indicators for the socioeconomic weights should be chosen with great care to ensure their exogeneity, unless their endogeneity is considered explicitly in the model specification".
The form of the spatial weight matrix is the following:
where ij d is the great circle distance between centroids of region i and j. ) k ( D i is the critical cut-off distance defined for each region i, above which interactions are assumed negligible.
In other words,
is the th k order smallest distance between regions i and j such that each region i has exactly k neighbors. Each matrix is row standardized so that it is relative 
4.3-Moran' I
We start further analysis of the spatial distribution of regional income and regional funds with the use of Moran's I statistics. It allows to capture the global spatial autocorrelation of the variables of interest. In other words, it gives for each variable the degree of linear association between its value at one location and the spatially weighted average of neighboring values.
We use a permutation approach with 10000 permutations (Anselin, 1995) 8 . Formally, for each variable of interest, the Moran's I is given by:
where ij w * is the (row-standardized) degree of connection between the spatial units i and j and it x is the variable of interest in region i at year t (measured as a deviation from the mean value for that year). Values of I larger (respectively smaller) than the expected value
indicate positive (resp. negative) spatial autocorrelation. In our case, clustering of regions with similar structural funds than with similar Community projects, for every weight matrices. Differences among values of Community projects seem smaller than among structural funds according to the standard deviation as well. One explanation is that the last ones have structural purposes, therefore their amount and location are targeted. On the contrary, the first ones depend more on national/regional contributions that easily complete Community support in the rich regions. Results also display a clustering of regions with high (slow) growth rates. The Moran's I is useful to detect global spatial autocorrelation, but it is not able to identify local patterns of spatial association, such as local spatial clusters or local spatial outliers of high (low) values that are statistically significant.
Identifying the groups of regions belonging to clustering of high (low) values of per capita income is based on the results of a Moran scatterplot. 9 The results are similar to those found with the Geary's c statistics. Complete results are available upon request.
4.4-Moran's scatterplot
The idea of the Moran scatterplot, suggested by Anselin (1996) , is to display the per capita income for each region (on the horizontal axis) against the standardized spatial weighted average (average of the neighbors' per capita income, also called spatial lag) on the vertical axis. As pointed out by Anselin (1999) , expressing the variables in standardized form (i.e. with mean zero and standard deviation equal to one) allows to assess both global spatial association, since the slope of the line is the Moran's I coefficient, and local spatial association (the quadrant in the scatterplot). The Moran scatterplot is therefore divided into four different quadrants corresponding to the four types of local spatial association between a region and its neighbors: Other signs of development concern three Belgian regions (Luxembourg, Brabant-Wallon, Antwerpen) and Yorkshire and the Humber (UK) which go from LH-type to HH-type.
On the contrary, signs of decline concern one Italian region (Abruzzo) that moves from HHtype to LL-type, Picardie (France), Trier and Lüneburg (Germany) and Drenthe (Netherlands) that move from HH-to LH-type. Moran scatterplot also allows to identify regions with higher spatial instability for both years (HL-type and LH-type): Aquitaine in France (HL),
whereas Corse, Languedoc-Roussillon, Limousin (France), Wales, North-East (UK), Namur, Hainaut (Belgium), Flevoland and Friesland (Netherlands) are LH-type. This implies that the spatial distribution of regional income is more complicated that the simple core-periphery framework previously noticed in the choropleth maps. Le reach the same results for 138 European regions over 1980-1995. The same method is applied to structural funds and Community projects total costs as well.
The results for structural funds are presented in figure The last three columns of table 2 give the scatterplot quadrants for total structural funds over the average income 89-99, Community projects total costs over the average income 89-99 and additional funds. The results for additional funds confirm that the rich regions are more able to accompany structural funds whereas the poor ones cannot. In Spain for instance the regions of Navarra, La Rioja and Cataluña have much accompanied Community funds, which may be a reason for increasing disparities among Spanish regions (Fayolle and Lecuyer, 2000) . <<insert table 2>>
4.5-LISA (Local Indicator of Spatial Association)
The previous scatterplots display a slight modification of the overall structure of spatial autocorrelation between the initial and the final year. For instance, some regions that were HH in the initial year belong to another quadrant in the final year. We therefore calculate LISA statistics for each observation to obtain more insight into the significant spatial clustering of similar values around that observation. Since we use a row-standardized matrix, the average of local Moran statistics is equal to the global Moran's I statistics. LISA statistics is used for the detection of significant local spatial clusters (also called "hot spots") as well as for the diagnostics of local instability, significant outliers and spatial regimes. Anselin (1995) formalize the local Moran's statistics for each region i and year t in this way:
with it x ( jt x ) is the observation in region i (j) at year t (measured as a deviation from the mean value for that year). The results from the application of LISA with k= 10 11 nearest neighbors are summarized in columns three to seven of table 2. The significance level is based on a conditional permutation approach with 10000 random permutations of the neighboring regions for each observations (Anselin, 1995) . The pseudo-significance level is 5%. However, due to a problem of multiple statistical comparison, since the neighborhood sets of two regions may contain common regions (Ord and Getis 1995; Anselin, 1995) , we follow the methodology of Le 12 and present also in column 8 the number of years for which the results are significant at a 5% Bonferroni pseudo-significance level (= 5% over 10 since we use the 10 nearest-neighbors).
In column three to seven of Instead of describing the significant results for LISA statistics on regional funds 14 , the last step of our analysis will focus directly on the correlation between structural funds (then additional funds) and regional growth presented in also insightful since they are HH-type growth but LH-type structural funds. On the contrary, 14 These results are presented in the last three columns of table 2. 15 We put this word in quotation marks because the per capita levels of regional assistance may be very different, even if they belong to the same quadrant in the Moran scatterplot.
Galicia, Andalucia (Spain) and Sterea Ellada (Greece) do not grow as well as their neighbors, even if they received "similar" structural assistance (LH growth, HH funds).
Clearly structural funds are not the main variable driving to even/uneven regional development. A closer look at the economic structure, the accessibility, the institutional aspects of each region as well as the type of projects that structural funds finance in these regions and their neighboring regions could help to understand why these regions display greater/smaller development than their neighbors even if they receive similar amount of structural funds.
A last probable explanation is the bias toward uneven regional investment rate due to additional funds. Again, the correlation displays that regions with low additional funds (the poor ones since they cannot afford additional investment) have a HH-type growth and inversely 16 . An interesting case is the one of these three regions that display significant LHtype for growth and LL-type for additional funds: Sterea Ellada in Greece, Andalucia and Galicia in Spain. Remember that these regions are HH-type for structural funds. Therefore, if they do not perform as well as their neighbors in terms of development, the reason does not come from higher additional funds in neighboring regions. Once again, a closer look at the specific economic structure of these regions as well as the use of regional funds could help to clarify the presence of "atypical" linkages between growth and structural funds detected in table 6.
Section V-Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to explore the spatial distribution of per capita GDP and of regional funds of 145 European regions over 1989-1999, using an exploratory spatial data analysis. This period corresponds to the two first programming periods wherein regional assistance to the poorest regions was implemented and developed. Among the spatial statistic tools, we first use Moran's I to detect the presence of positive global spatial autocorrelation in the distribution of per capita GDP. In other words, the rich (poor) regions have a propensity to be clustered close to other rich (poor) regions. Global spatial autocorrelation also characterizes the regional growth rate, structural funds and Community projects total costs. Further analysis using Moran's scatterplot reveals also the presence of positive local spatial autocorrelation for each of the previous variables. 16 Complete results upon request.
When LISA is performed, the results confirm the significant presence and persistence over time of local spatial autocorrelation in the form of two distinct spatial clusters of high and low values of per capita income. This form of spatial heterogeneity reflects a core-periphery pattern since per capita GDP inequalities are persistent among European regions. LISA is also performed on the spatial distribution of the regional growth rate. A negative relationship between the spatial pattern of regional growth and initial income level is detected among the significant results, which seems consistent with the hypothesis of β -convergence. A positive relationship between regional growth and structural funds is also identified among the significant results. It reflects the distributional efforts of the European Commission which devotes the most important part of its funds to help the least developed regions and provides little assistance to the rich regions. However, the results also indicate that structural funds are clearly not the only variable to control for the various growth rates among European regions. This is confirmed by the presence of "atypical" linkages between both variables (for Andalucia, Galicia and Sterea Ellada). These results show that studies on European regional development should take into account the level of structural funds devoted to the objective region itself, but also to its neighboring regions. This paper calls for further research in a spatial econometric perspective where spatial effects, initial conditions and the spatial distribution of both structural funds and Community projects total costs would be included in the estimation of the convergence process among European regions. IT11   IT12  IT13   IT2   IT31   IT32  IT33  IT4  IT51   IT52   IT53   IT6  IT71   IT72  IT8   IT91   IT92   IT93   ITA   ITB   LU  N LL LL* Note: Level of pseudo-significance p<0.05. Not sign. denotes the number of years local statistics is not significant at 0.05. Maximum number of years is 11. HH, number of years local statistics of significant and in quadrant HH of Moran's scatterplot; LL, number of years local statistics of significant and in quadrant LL of Moran's scatterplot; HL, number of years local statistics of significant and in quadrant HL of Moran's scatterplot; LH, number of years local statistics of significant and in quadrant LH of Moran's scatterplot. Bonf. 5% indicates the number of years the statistics is significant at 5% Bonferroni pseudo-significance level. Growth 89-99 indicates if local statistics of growth rate over 1989-1999 is significant or not, if yes, then the quadrant in Moran's scatterplot it belongs to. ns means no significance at p<0.05. fs/m is total structural funds 89-99 divided by the region's mean per capita GDP over 1989-1999; ct/m is Community projects total costs 89-99 divided by the region's mean per capita GDP over 1989-1999; ct/fs is Community projects total costs divided by structural funds over 1989-1999, * indicates that the LISA statistics is not significant at the 5% pseudo-significance level. (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) by initial per capita GDP (1989) 
